



AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY OF AIR SAFETY INVESTIGATORS

QUARTERLY JOURNAL

Summer 2021

Who is that masked man??



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Summer 2021



Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thankfully 2020 has gone, but the memory lingers on. How many of us can honestly say that we had a good year; given the cessation of travel, the effective dismantling of our industry and the savage slashing of employment and conditions in order to survive this pandemic?

From an ASASI perspective we have effectively marked time, as have our ISASI colleagues around the world. We've seen the Montreal Seminar transition from a great expectation to a virtual event, still hoping to make its mark in August this year. Indeed our own Gold Coast Seminar in conjunction with our Kiwi cousins was moved to June this year, with all our fingers and toes crossed for a successful gathering. Your Executive will be committing, or otherwise, to lock and load for this prior to mid-March.

On the positive side we managed to reduce our annual membership subscription fees across the board to assist those members doing it tough out there. It was quite moving to see the generosity of some members by making double payments, and others offering to pay the former rates to assist members having difficulties. They asked for anonymity and we will respect their wishes.

Our student sponsorship program is now well established. The Flight Safety Foundation - Macarthur Job scholarship for 2020 was awarded to Matthew Harris, a PhD student from the University of Southern Queensland. His winning paper, as adjudged by the FSF Technical Advisory Committee, titled ***New ideas on how to implement lessons learned from safety investigations back into industry: The supervisor's role.*** was highly regarded and set a standard for future scholarships.

In keeping with our vision, there are other scholarship initiatives in the pipeline for our future aviation safety investigators. We hope to announce these in the near future.

A pleasing element to 2021 has been the influx of new members to ASASI. We welcome them and look forward to their active contributions to our Society going forward. Their individual experience adds to our collective capital.

Until next time, stay safe.

John Guselli
ASASI President

The State of Play*

Our industry continues to bounce around the bottom of that precarious position between survival and despair. In Australia, the sometimes illogical attitudes and applications demonstrated by our individual states and territories to border closures means that there is minimal confidence in any commencement of operations by air operators.

This in turn has led to a knock-on effect such that tech crew, engineering maintainers and cabin crew are not being mobilised until some certainty is available. Overseas agencies are now reporting a trend that indicates that the inertia in commencing operations is leading to degraded skills across the board. This issue of currency is real, and will require careful monitoring as the pandemic diminishes.

We don't require an in-depth analysis to interpret the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) graph below that indicates our current *'state of play'* with retrospect to aircraft movements at major airports within Australia.

For the twelve month period ended in November 2020 there was only one national domestic airport to register a positive trend. **Ballina**, in northern New South Wales pushed past the 20% mark as opposed to every other airport. Some might suggest this apparent aberration to be a product of the Queensland border closures, at the height of the tourist season or perhaps even the influx of overseas celebrities seeking a COVID safe environment in the less hazardous southern hemisphere. Regardless, the data is there.

*According to John Guselli



IATA does not consider airline safety ratings to be a valid measure of an organisation's safety performance



IATA has recently published a position paper on Airline Safety Ratings.

The Issue

A number of companies produce reports purporting to rate/rank airlines against one another according to their level of safety. Because no objective criteria or metrics exist by which it is possible to do this, these organizations will use a variety of subjective “yardsticks” to compare airlines. These typically include the number of accidents and/or serious incidents experienced by an airline over a given period. Information is usually drawn from publicly available sources such as the news media. The exact formulas for determining the rankings may or may not be made available for examination and analysis.

IATA’s Position

IATA does not consider airline safety ratings or rankings to be a valid measure of an individual organization’s safety performance. Furthermore, IATA does not believe that aviation safety should become a competitive issue as it would violate the industry’s position that safety is the highest priority of all involved in aviation. The extraordinary safety performance of commercial air transport is in large part owing to the strong spirit of cooperation on safety-related issues among airlines, manufacturers, government regulators and other stakeholders.

Specific factors that make airline ratings a highly speculative exercise providing no value to air travelers include the following:

Small data samples give big swings in the accident rate

- Airline accidents, especially fatal accidents, are extremely rare. Large variations in rates can result from a single event.

Accountability for an accident is not clear cut

- External factors and events involving non-airline participants (i.e. aircraft manufacturers, airports, air navigation service providers, ground handling companies, etc.) can contribute to an accident or incident.

A simple ranking cannot give a complete safety picture

- The severity of the accident has to be judged and taken into account in a ranking system, yet the severity of an accident is often affected by external conditions and events.
- It is very difficult to offer a precise weighting of results by timescale and size of airline, especially noting that airlines change operating fleets, destinations, and many other characteristics on an on-going basis.

A ranking approach attributes responsibility for accidents and incidents solely to an airline, regardless of other contributing factors. This violates a key principal of safety research, which recognizes that most accidents involve a chain of events that may involve multiple participants. For these reasons, airline safety rankings are inherently flawed

Fifty Years Ago in Sydney

At 2137hrs on the 29th January 1971; (that's right, fifty years ago), Sydney Airport almost earned the mantle of a disaster zone when a runway collision took place between a domestic Boeing 727 (VH-TJA) departing, and an arriving international DC8-63. A total of 240 persons narrowly escaped a conflagration that night.

Like so many other occurrences where we usually shake our collective heads, this event held contributory factors that still exist today. In those days, it was referred to as "*the right stuff*" but now, fifty years on, we talk of human factors and resource management.

The following (sometimes fuzzy text) extracts from the formal investigation report are not meant to attribute blame or apportion liability, rather they are provided to show us that humans are still involved with aircraft operations and rely on each component part of our system to deliver the safety outcome.

As an ASASI member, it is worth the investment of a few minutes to read this material and reflect on both those predisposing underlying factors and the facilitating operational situations that contributed to this event.

For those seeking the complete analysis and investigation appendices, they are available at <https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24753/197101202.pdf>



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT 71-1

Air Safety Investigation Branch

Department of Civil Aviation
Australia

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

**CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES DC8-63
AIRCRAFT CF-CPO
and
TRANS-AUSTRALIA AIRLINES BOEING
727 AIRCRAFT VH-TJA
AT SYDNEY (KINGSFORD SMITH) AIRPORT
NEW SOUTH WALES ON 29 JANUARY, 1971**

The investigation of this aircraft accident was authorised by the Director-General of Civil Aviation pursuant to the powers conferred by Air Navigation Regulation 278.

Prepared by:
Air Safety Investigation Branch Melbourne

August, 1971

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THE ACCIDENT

At approximately 2137 hours Eastern Standard Time on 29 January 1971, a Trans-Australia Airlines Boeing 727 aircraft, VH-TJA, struck the tail fin of a Canadian Pacific Airlines DC8-63 aircraft, CF-CPQ, whilst the former was taking off on Runway 16 at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport, New South Wales. Both aircraft were engaged in regular public transport services and the Boeing 727 aircraft continued with its take-off but landed again at Sydney Airport 40 minutes later after dumping fuel and when preparations for the emergency landing had been completed. At the time of the collision the DC8-63 aircraft was on the ground, having just landed, and it taxied under its own power to the parking apron. Both aircraft were substantially damaged in the collision but none of the 240 persons on board the two aircraft was injured.

1—INVESTIGATION

1.1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHTS

At 2129 hours EST on 29 January 1971, the flight crew of the Boeing 727 aircraft, registered VH-TJA, called the surface movement controller in Sydney Tower, informed him that they were Flight 592 bound for Perth, Western Australia and requested a clearance to taxi from the loading apron. This aircraft is owned by the Australian National Airlines Commission and operated by Trans-Australia Airlines who hold an airline licence to operate Boeing 727 aircraft between a number of Australian airports including Sydney and Perth. The aircraft was under the command of Captain W.O. James and there were seven other crew members and 84 passengers on board. The aircraft was given instructions for clearing the apron area and it proceeded along Taxiways 'L' and 'G' towards the holding point for Runway 16 (see Appendix A).

At 2130:20 hours the crew of the DC8-63 aircraft, registered CF-CPQ, first called the aerodrome controller in Sydney Tower, having just left 3,000 feet at the West Pymble locator on an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 16. This aircraft is owned by Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd., who hold an appropriate international airline licence to operate DC8-63 aircraft between Vancouver and Sydney. The aircraft was under the command of Captain C.E. Magrath, with 11 other crew members and 136 passengers on board. The aerodrome controller, in response to this call, instructed the aircraft to report again at the outer marker.

Whilst CF-CPQ was continuing with its instrument approach to Runway 16, the crew of VH-TJA obtained their airways clearance from the surface movement controller and, having reached the holding point, informed the aerodrome controller, on the appropriate frequency at 2133:47 hours, that they were ready to take off. At this time CF-CPQ, which was on short final approach, had been cleared to land and VH-TJA was instructed to line-up on the runway behind that aircraft. After CF-CPQ was observed to pass the threshold of the runway, the crew of VH-TJA proceeded to line-up and await their clearance for take-off.

As the landing DC8-63 aircraft neared the end of its landing run, the aerodrome controller instructed it to "...take taxiway right—call on 121.7" and this instruction was acknowledged. The crew of the Canadian aircraft, however, state that they read this instruction as "—backtrack if you like—change to 121.7" and they proceeded to turn the aircraft right about on the runway and to taxi back directly towards the Boeing 727. The landing run of CF-CPQ finished directly opposite the entrance to Taxiway "I", which leads off to the right from Runway 16 (see Appendix A). As this very long aircraft, sometimes known as a 'stretched' or Super DC8, approached its taxiing speed in the landing roll, Captain Magrath steered it towards the left-hand edge of the runway so that he would have available the full width of the runway which is needed to turn this aircraft onto a reciprocal heading. The length and weight of an aircraft of this type demand, even under ideal conditions, that taxiing manoeuvres shall be carried out with great care and at quite slow speeds. The fact that it had been raining at Sydney and the runway surface was wet heightened the need for care in taxiing. It is apparent that the right-hand turn on the runway was carried out very slowly and took a significantly longer time than is customary for other aircraft commonly using the airport. Coincidentally, the turn was carried out opposite the entrance to Taxiway 'I' although it was not necessary to use any part of the taxiway to complete the turn. Nevertheless, the aerodrome controller saw the landing run of CF-CPQ finish opposite the taxiway and saw the aircraft turn towards the taxiway. When he believed that, in conformity with his instructions, the aircraft had entered the taxiway and was clear of the runway, he cleared VH-TJA for take-off. This clearance was given at 2135:38 hours.

The evidence indicates that, following the instruction issued by the aerodrome controller, the flight crew of CF-CPQ changed to the surface movement control radio frequency, 121.7 mc., at about the time they commenced the turn on the runway. In these circumstances they would not have been able to overhear the clearance for take-off issued to VH-TJA. It has been calculated that some 16 seconds after the take-off clearance was acknowledged, CF-CPQ would have completed its turn about on the runway. The flight crew of the aircraft have stated that, at this time, they still had all of their four landing lights illuminated, as well as the wing flood lights, the navigation lights and the upper and lower rotating anti-collision beacons. Soon after Captain Magrath commenced to backtrack down the centre of the runway he noticed that the aircraft, whose landing lights he had already seen near the threshold of Runway 16 was, in fact, coming towards him. He immediately increased power and commenced to steer his aircraft off the runway towards its eastern side. Before he could vacate the runway, however, but at about the time that the nose of his aircraft reached the eastern edge, the approaching aircraft, which he watched rotate and lift off, flew over the top of CF-CPQ. He felt a jolt which he interpreted as his nosewheel entering a depression off the edge of the runway or, alternatively, over-running an elevated runway light but, the immediate danger having passed, he then steered his aircraft back towards the centre-line of the runway.

Captain James, in VH-TJA, says that his attention was not attracted to any obstruction in his aircraft's path until he had commenced the rotation action for

the take-off and so he concentrated his attention on continuing to use a normal take-off technique, guarding particularly against any over-rotation, in the belief that this would be the best means of clearing the obstructing aircraft.

As Captain Magrath steered CF-CPQ towards the eastern edge of the runway in order to avoid the on-coming aircraft the sweep of his landing lights was observed in the control tower and the surface movement controller, believing that the aircraft was commencing a turn from Taxiway 'V' into Taxiway 'A', which leads back onto the runway, instructed the aircraft, first of all, to "hold position" and then "...continue straight ahead along the taxiway and cross Runway 07". By this time, however, the crew of CF-CPQ had observed the landing lights of a DC9 aircraft, VH-TJN, which was approaching to land on Runway 16. They pointed this out to the surface movement controller who then asked them to confirm that they were on the taxiway and the answer given from CF-CPQ was "Negative sir, we're on the runway, we were cleared to backtrack on the runway". The approaching DC9 aircraft, VH-TJN, was instructed immediately to go around and the crew of CF-CPQ were given fresh instructions to vacate the runway at the next taxiway on their left.

It was at about this time that the crew of VH-TJA informed the aerodrome controller that they had struck the DC8 during their take-off and that they had lost hydraulic pressure in their "A" system, which is one of the primary hydraulic systems of the aircraft. This aircraft then proceeded to an off-shore position to dump fuel and returned for a successful landing on Runway 16 at 2216:30 hours. The crew of CF-CPQ was informed of the report that the departing aircraft had struck them but, since there was no indication in the cockpit of abnormal operation, they continued to their parking position. Here it was observed that substantial portions of the upper fin and rudder were missing from the aircraft.

1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	—	—	—
Non-Fatal	—	—	—
None	20	220	

1.3 DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

Both aircraft were substantially damaged.

1.4 OTHER DAMAGE

There was minor damage to a building when some components fell from VH-TJA during the landing approach to Runway 16, post-accident.

During the examination of radio communications on the aerodrome control frequency, 120.5 mc, recorded on the ground, it was noticed that, at 2136:12 hours, a five word question "How far ahead is he", from an unidentified source, was recorded (see Appendix B). Each air traffic controller in Sydney Tower at the relevant time and each member of the flight crews of VH-TJA, VH-TJN and VH-EWJ, all of whom were listening on this frequency at the relevant time, was questioned as to whether he originated or overheard these words. Each of the persons questioned denied having uttered the words and none of them could recall having heard them at the time they were spoken. Since the nature of the question implicit in the words "How far ahead is he" and the time at which it was spoken were potentially quite significant in the investigation of this accident, it was decided that an attempt should be made to identify the originator of these words by more positive means.

The assistance of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the United States of America and, in particular, that of Mr R.D. Rudich, the Chief of the Board's Audio Laboratory was enlisted. For some time now the Board has been equipped with "Voiceprint Sound Spectrograph" facilities and, in using this equipment, Mr Rudich has developed, to a high degree, methods of identifying the source of sounds, including voice sounds, audible on an aircraft flight deck. The technique involves a visual comparative evaluation of frequency spectrograms produced by this equipment. It is in use in many other contexts including the teaching and medical professions as well as in communications engineering and crime detection. Persons who are expert in this specialised field state that they can identify a person by his speech characteristics as certainly as he could be identified by his fingerprints.

Several re-recordings were produced in Australia by copying from the original recordings not only the phrase "How far ahead is he" but also a number of other transmissions selected to embrace all the aircraft and the aerodrome controller who were on this frequency at the relevant time. From these transmissions Mr Rudich selected sounds or phonemes similar to those contained in the phrase under investigation and, after a comparative evaluation of five such phonemes, he concluded that the words "How far ahead is he" originated from the aircraft VH-TJA and did not originate from any of the other aircraft on the frequency or from Sydney Tower.

A further examination was then made by Mr Rudich of a wide range of transmissions made from VH-TJA both before and after the accident. From this study Mr Rudich concluded that the words "How far ahead is he" were originated in VH-TJA by the same person as also originated the communications made from that aircraft at 2139:52, 2140:50 (second transmission made from VH-TJA) 2141:27 and 2142:47 hours (see Appendix B). Having regard to the content and phrasing of these communications there can be no doubt that they were originated by Captain James.

In the light of this conclusion, consideration has been given to the means whereby the words "How far ahead is he", spoken by Captain James, could have been recorded on the ground. Obviously the words were transmitted on the radio frequency 120.5 mc. but, in themselves, they contain no indication as to whom they are addressed or to whom any reply should have been directed, There is, however, at least one tenable explanation of this otherwise puzzling event. In Boeing 727 aircraft operated by Trans-Australia Airlines the flight crew normally communicate with each other during critical flight operations, such as take-off, via the aircraft intercommunication system using head phones and boom microphones. Of course the same equipment is used for the transmission and reception of radio communications on the particular frequency being guarded at the moment. At any desired time the captain or first officer may transmit a radio communication by depressing the upper half of a rocker switch mounted on his control yoke. If he wishes to communicate with other members of his flight crew via the aircraft's inter-communication system, he merely depresses the lower portion of this same rocker switch. It is by no means impossible or unlikely that the captain or first officer may inadvertently depress his switch in such a way that a communication intended only for the other flight crew members in the aircraft is also transmitted on the radio frequency being guarded. Such an inadvertent selection would not necessarily deprive the other flight crew members of the communication intended for them but would merely allow it to be heard and recorded outside the aircraft. It seems likely that some such inadvertent operation of the captain's transmitter selector switch occurred during this take-off.

2.5 CAUSAL FACTORS

The evidence in respect of this accident indicates that it resulted from a combination of errors made by persons. The first of these errors was the misreading, by the flight crew of CF-CPQ, of the taxiing clearance issued by the aerodrome controller. It is considered that there was nothing in the aerodrome controller's actions at this stage which contributed to this misreading and it arose fundamentally because inadequate attention to its words and its import was given by the flight crew. The problems of language and accent are not new to international aviation nor to the flight crew of CF-CPQ. This is all the more reason why international crews must give great care to the proper reading of clearances and ensure that they make sense in the context of the particular operation. There is little doubt that, if a clearance such as the one adopted by the Canadian crew, had been offered to an Australian crew having normal familiarity with operations and control procedures at Sydney Airport, it would not have been accepted without confirmation or query. Backtracking on a runway at a busy airport such as Sydney, is

There is a tendency amongst those airline pilots who carry out most of their flying activities within controlled airspace, to accept the fact that they are protected by a traffic separation service in which they have some confidence. In many circumstances, of course, the pilot of an aircraft is not in a position to know whether or not a clearance issued to him is a safe one having regard to the disposition of other aircraft. Visual operations on and around an airport, however, are not in this category. It is considered that Captain James, on this occasion, accepted the clearance for take-off and, not only failed to satisfy himself as to its correctness, so far as it lay within his power, but persisted with the take-off, in the face of clear signs that the take-off operation was not a safe one. The Canadian aircraft with its upper and lower red rotating beacons illuminated should have been visible to the crew of VH-TJA throughout its occupancy of the runway. The evidence indicates that its presence on the runway was recognised by Captain James at a point where there could have been no doubt as to his capacity to avoid a collision by abandoning the take-off. In the event, he decided that he could overfly or would attempt to overfly the obstructing aircraft using normal take-off techniques. Even at this stage the aircraft had ample capacity to climb over the obstructing aircraft and Captain James' adherence to normal techniques in the face of the very real hazard in front of him was erroneous.

Although the stage for this accident was set, first of all, by the misreading of the clearance which occurred in CF-CPQ and then by the issuance of a take-off clearance arising from the aerodrome controller's misjudgement of its position, the accident could still have been avoided if the flight crew of VH-TJA had taken proper precautions to observe the runway ahead and to adopt new and more appropriate courses of action when the dangers of the situation became apparent. It was the conjunction of errors on the flight decks of both aircraft and in Sydney Tower which led to and, therefore, caused this accident.

3—CONCLUSIONS

1. The flight crews of both aircraft involved in this accident and the air traffic controllers on duty in Sydney Tower were all appropriately licensed for the duties they were undertaking. The pilot-in-command of the DC8-63 aircraft, CF-CPQ, however, had not satisfied all of the applicable route and airport familiarisation requirements prior to commencing this flight.
2. There is no evidence of any defect in either aircraft which could have contributed to this accident.
3. Both aircraft were loaded within the safe limits applicable to each.

able. Similarly, a clearance which offers a choice of action to an aircraft without any request to be advised of the course to be followed is quite untypical of any air traffic control practice used in Australia. In these circumstances, it would seem that a greater familiarity with operations at Sydney Airport would have prevented the Canadian crew from falling into an error of this sort. Thus, in some degree, the circumstances in which Captain Magrath was appointed pilot-in-command of this aircraft and the effectiveness of Captain Ellert's supervision, must be regarded as relevant to the cause of the accident.

The second significant error was the belief of the aerodrome controller that CF-CPQ had vacated the runway via Taxiway 'I' and that it was safe to clear VH-TJA for take-off without obtaining a "clear of the runway" report from CF-CPQ. Having regard to the limitations of visual perception, it is not difficult to understand how the aerodrome controller could be deceived in attempting to discriminate some three quarters of a mile away on a dark night and with a very shallow line-of-sight closure with the ground. Undoubtedly, the problem was compounded by the very slow movements of CF-CPQ on the ground and the fact that its turn on the runway was carried out opposite the entrance to Taxiway 'I'. Although the aerodrome controller had undergone extensive training and was properly licensed and rated for this position, his experience of its responsibilities was still relatively small. In these circumstances, the origin of the flaw in his performance must be sought in his training rather than in his experience. All four of the air traffic controllers on duty in Sydney Tower on this night say that they believed CF-CPQ entered Taxiway 'I' and that the runway was clear when the take-off clearance was given. It is apparent, therefore, that adequate recognition of the difficulties of visual perception, in the circumstances that prevailed, had not been given in the training of these officers at Sydney.

The third factor of importance in the sequence of events which led to this accident, was the failure of the flight crew of VH-TJA to ensure that the runway was clear and safe for take-off. It is true that their aircraft had been cleared by the aerodrome controller for take-off and that such a clearance reflected the view of the aerodrome controller that the runway was, in fact, unobstructed. The expression of such a view, however, does not absolve the pilot-in-command of any aircraft from taking all of the actions necessary to satisfy himself that there is no impediment to a safe take-off. Air Navigation Regulation 143 (1)(a) clearly states that "The pilot-in-command of an aircraft which is being operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision". The fact that a clearance issued by an air traffic controller does not detract from this responsibility is clear from the terms of Air Navigation Regulation 96(3) which says "If an emergency arises that necessitates a deviation from the requirements of an air traffic control clearance, in the interests of safety, the pilot-in-command may make such deviation as is necessary...". Indeed there can be no doubt that, in any circumstances, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft has an over-riding and final responsibility for its safety and for the safety of persons on

4. A taxiing clearance "...take taxiway right—call on 121.7" issued by the aerodrome controller to CF-CPQ as it neared the end of its landing roll was not given adequate attention by the flight crew, who misread it as "...backtrack if you like—change to 121.7". The aircraft was then turned through 180 degrees to backtrack on the runway, instead of entering an immediately available taxiway as was intended by the aerodrome controller.
5. The aerodrome controller did not recognise the difficulties of visual perception in the circumstances that prevailed and this, in conjunction with the slow manoeuvre of the aircraft on the runway as well as its direction of movement and position in relation to the taxiway entrance, led him to believe that CF-CPQ had taxied off the runway in accordance with the instructions issued.
6. The aerodrome controller issued, to VH-TJA, a clearance for take-off when the runway was still obstructed by CF-CPQ.
7. The flight crew of VH-TJA state that, at the commencement of their take-off, they did not observe CF-CPQ on the runway as an obstruction. Nevertheless CF-CPQ was observed at a time when the take-off could have been abandoned with safety. The pilot-in-command of VH-TJA elected to continue the take-off and attempted to overfly the obstructing aircraft.
8. Although the obstructing aircraft could have been cleared quite safely by the adoption of a steeper initial climb angle, the pilot-in-command of VH-TJA adhered to the normal take-off technique and the underside of his aircraft came into collision with the tail fin of CF-CPQ. Although substantially damaged, VH-TJA continued in flight, and after dumping fuel, landed at Sydney Airport again without further damage.

CAUSE: The cause of this accident was that the taxiing clearance given after landing was misread by the flight crew of CF-CPQ and this error was not detected by the aerodrome controller, who cleared VH-TJA for take-off. The flight crew of VH-TJA, on detecting the obstructing aircraft, did not then adopt the most effective means of avoiding a collision.




In this issue we once again acknowledge that there is not a lot of aviation activity taking place right now, so we continue to reflect on 'the good old days'. Remember when there was a shortage of aircrew and specialist maintenance personnel??

ASASI commenced from humble beginnings but the initiative and vision of the founders set a standard that has weathered a number of influences and overt threats over the years.

It is our intention to reproduce relevant elements of our history so that we might appreciate how we came to be what we are collectively in the 21st century.

What you can read for yourself next, are the minutes of the very first meeting of the fledgling Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators (ASASI), almost forty three years ago. Many of these people were ex-wartime servicemen, but their experiences from military to civilian life set the foundations for our society.

We will follow up with a series of interesting and topical events of the past in the history of ASASI. Any contributions of text, images or just good yarns will be gratefully accepted and acknowledged.



The Australian Society
of Air Safety Investigators

Minutes
of Inaugural Meeting held at
Aviation House
188 Queen Street, Melbourne
on 1 March 1978

PRESENT :

Paul Choquenat	John Benton
Jim Sandercock	John Day
Griff Hughes	George Dodkin
Bob Whitecross	Mike Lewino
Ted McKenzie	Alan Woodward
Ian Stacy	Peter Graham
Alan Green	Ron Smith
Frank Yeend	Jim Doubleday
Harry Mortlock	Ted Tovell
Geoff Banfield	Don Ende
Don Whalley	Ian Mason
John Hopkins	Ian Smith

APOLOGIES :

Tony Harris	Col Geraghty
Ian Leslie	Ian Milligan

The meeting opened at 1700 hours EST
Provisional Chairman : Paul Choquenat
Provisional Secretary/Treasurer : Jim Sandercock

Paul Choquenat outlined the proposed agenda for the meeting and discussed the developments in the work to form an Australian Society. The idea for an Australian Chapter was considered some years ago and a small group of members of the Society had worked towards this end. Formation of the

Australian Chapter was delayed by the by formation of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators. Work continued to form an Australian Society and a provisional Constitution was drafted.

On 1 February 1978 a meeting of seventeen members and prospective members was held at Air Liquide House to discuss the proposed formation of The Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators.

The minutes of the meeting on 1 February 1978 were read Moved by Bob Whitecross that the minutes be accepted as read. Secured by Jim Doubleday Motion carried.

Paul Choquetat described the subsequent events arising from the meeting of 1 February 1978 and the nominations for office bearers in the Australian Society. He sought a motion of approval of action of the Provisional Committee.

The motion was moved by Don Ende Secured by Ted McKenzie. Motion carried.

Bob Whitecross moved that a motion be put to form The Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators Secured John Benton Motion carried

Paul Choquetat detailed the outcome of the nominations for office bearers. A committee consisting of George Dodkins and John Day were appointed to scrutinise the nominations received by the closing date 20 February 1978.

The Committee found the nominations to be valid The Committee agreed that as the nominations for President - Paul Choquetat Vice President - John Benton, and Secretary/Treasurer - Ian Smith

were unanimous, a ballot of members was not necessary. The three named office bearers were then proclaimed duly elected and they then commenced their respective duties. The President and Choquetat took the Chair.

The President then discussed the proposed Constitution of the Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators.

The draft Constitution had been submitted to Bob Edwards (ACS) who had checked the document for legal correctness. This move had been recommended and he believed resulted in a better document.

Jim Doubleday asked the Chair if the final draft had been sent to each Region.

The Chairman explained that time had not permitted this action. The original draft had been circulated for comment and the few changes proposed had been of a minor nature only.

Frank Ueend asked the Chair if the meeting accepted the Constitution in its present form could it be changed at a future date.

The Chairman explained that the Constitution and ^{The} By-Laws could be amended, repealed or altered in part or in whole by the vote of two thirds of the members.

Motion that the draft Constitution placed before the meeting be accepted.

Moved Jim Sandvecock
Seconded Jim Doubleday
Motion carried.

The formation of the various committees set out in Article VI of the Constitution was discussed. The Membership Committee was considered to be

the most important at this stage and it was agreed that such a committee would be formed in the near future

Frank Ueend sought clarity on the Australian Society members relationship with ISASI.

The chairman stated that ISASI will continue to issue badges and scrolls. We will administer the Australian Society for ISASI. We will handle the fees for ISASI. We may call for \$1 or \$2 above the ISASI charge to cover Australian administration costs. Exchange should provide additional funds and it is expected that ISASI will grant the Australian Society \$US 200 as a starting up fund.

General Business

Bob Whitecross tendered apologies for Arthur Lovell who is in Brisbane.

John Hopkins on membership. Are all those eligible already members.

Chairman No. Time has not permitted full canvassing of industry. The major airlines and organisations such as Hawker De Havilland etc will be approached

Bob Whitecross on meetings. As a professional Society it would be desirable to have regular meetings with a guest speaker and invite prominent people who may have an interest in air safety investigation. The Chairman stated that the executive will look closely at this aspect and a committee will be formed to develop such meetings

The Vice President spoke on the hard work

and time which Paul Choquet, Jim Sandercock and their helpers had expended in the forming of the Australian Society

No further business
The chairman invited the members present to attend the Hardware Club to launch the new Australian Society in a fitting manner

1750 hours EST the meeting was closed

Paul Choquet
1/5/79



HAPPY PLANES

We are fortunate to have another strong alliance in our quest for enhanced aviation safety. As a sub-group of ASASI **The Asia Pacific Cabin Safety Working Group (APCSWG)** is a not-for-profit body of aviation safety supporters, including airline crew, trainers, investigators and managers, as well as the regulators. They meet bi-annually to facilitate the exchange of cabin safety information and sharing of resources, with the aim of promoting a proactive approach to cabin safety across the industry. Members may attend as individuals or as representatives of the organisation with which they may be associated. ASASI stalwart **Susan Rice** has provided this insight to the plight of APCSWG members today.



Our thoughts for a positive, safe and healthy 2021 are with one and all as we manage and negotiate our way through difficult and life changing circumstances. Despite the upheaval and chaos that has adversely affected aviation this past year there has been continual effort to provide a safe and workable passenger carrying industry. Sadly, on an international level we are aware of the great many operators who have gone into liquidation, not to fly again.

The circumstances in our 'Region' have been similar to the international experience. Long Haul/International operators have suffered the greatest loss and that may well continue for quite some time. Not to say all operators have not struggled, experienced huge difficulties and enormous uncertainty within their organisations. However, domestic operators have possibly fared a little better together with traditional smaller/ regional operators who operate within their own national and state borders.

The human factors/personal wellbeing toll this pandemic has taken on all directly and indirectly affected individual is immeasurable. Our international Cabin Crew and Pilots have for the most part been grounded, and remain so. In an effort to remain solvent, where possible, operators have offered redundancies to thousands of Air Crew, Maintenance Staff and Ground Staff. Sadly, many thousands of others have simply lost their income, their life-style and face an acceptance that life as they have known it will not be the same again.

Closer to home in Australia we have seen the re-emergence of Regional Express, REX, to operating B737-800 aircraft and commencing services between Sydney and Melbourne in the coming weeks. Best of Good Luck to them! Virgin has risen from the ashes with dramatic changes to their business model and we sincerely wish them the very best of Good Luck as they work to provide air services and retain as many loyal employees as possible. With the previous mention of industry losing a huge number of operational staff there will inevitably be a loss of skill, knowledge and experience. This is an unprecedented time and the road back will be difficult for all involved.

A number of our members no longer have their aviation roles to return to and are finding new roles on their way forward to creating their new futures. By their nature Cabin Crew are flexible and have a wonderful spirit that enables them to embrace new opportunities and expand upon making the very best of a situation. We wish everyone success for their new path, whether within industry or outside of industry.



We recently welcomed WAI as partners in aviation safety and we look forward to the mutual benefits that will be derived into the future.

Members seeking further details about the work of WAI Australia can find it all at <https://waiaustralia.org/>



The Kalinin K7 Bomber

The Kalinin K7 was a Russian heavy experimental aircraft designed and tested in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. It was of unusual configuration, with twin booms and large underwing pods housing fixed landing gear and machine gun turrets.

The K-7 first flew on 11 August 1933. The very brief first flight showed instability and serious vibration caused by the airframe resonating with the engine frequency. The solution to this was thought to be to shorten and strengthen the tail booms, little being known then about the natural frequencies of structures and their response to vibration. The aircraft completed seven test flights before a crash due to structural failure of one of the tail booms on 21 November 1933.

The existence of the aircraft had only recently been announced by Pravda which declared it was "victory of the utmost political importance" since it had been built with steel produced in the USSR rather than imported. The accident killed 14 people aboard and one on the ground. Flight speculated that sabotage was suspected as the investigating committee had representation by the state security organization, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU).

Note the arrangement of the engines. Just imagine the mag check!

Meet our New Members

In each edition we will demonstrate the diversity of practical and academic expertise within our Society.

For the Summer Bulletin, ASASI is delighted to introduce four of our newest members.

Each brings a different facet of specialisation to ASASI and we look forward to meeting them and sharing their experiences.



Leslie Mc Chesney is the General Manager of Sky360 and is based in Perth. She specialises in aviation training and safety and quality industries. She is skilled in Auditing, Operations, Quality Management Systems, Safety Management Systems, and Continuous Improvement.

Sultan Ahmed is an intern with Z Aviation Australia and specialises in Consulting & Project Management Roles in Airline Operations Optimization, Airport Operations, Safety Management Systems, Emergency Response Planning, Aviation Security, Organizational Audits as per IOSA/ISAGO and Investigations.



Two of our latest members are also worthy winners of *ASASI Scholarships*. These provide annual memberships to women selected by WAI for their service to our industry.

The 2020 winners are:



Rhiannon LaRosa is Head of Aircraft Airworthiness and Maintenance Control for Maroomba Airlines in Perth

Sophia Miller-Hamor is a Safety, Risk & Compliance Specialist in the Cargo division of Virgin Australia in Brisbane



2020 Annual General Meeting

The 2020 Annual General Meeting was held virtually on the evening of 10th December 2020.

Key discussion items related to;

- International Council Meeting 2020
- Current ISASI Initiatives
- Seminars and Contingencies
- Scholarships
- Sponsorships
- Reachout Program, and;
- General Business

The minutes of the AGM are available from the ASASI website at www.asasi.org

ASASI was particularly grateful for the excellent facilitation provided by *The University of New South Wales* in making this happen.

For those members old enough to remember *The Muppets*, this may remind you of how we were looking on the night!




And this procedure was not required!



Position Vacant – ASASI Webmaster

After many years of great support, our webmaster Neil Campbell is packing up his keyboard and stepping back from the role. ASASI is looking for somebody unique to fill this important vacancy which is critical to getting our message out around the world.



There is no payment, but there is a lot of appreciation for the successful applicant! Please form an orderly queue.

Applications to asasiexecutive@gmail.com please.

Calling All Part 135 Pilots

We are still seeking volunteers to assist a PhD student, studying at the University of Southern Queensland. *Matt Harris* is conducting a research project seeking *'The supervisors' role in influencing risk-taking in the context of normal aviation operations'*. For us to assist this project and to share in the benefits derived from it, we are seeking volunteer rotary and fixed-wing pilots across Australia and New Zealand that fit the following criteria:

- a) The participants should be eligible to operate under CAR Part 135.
- b) Hold a current CPL or ATPL, and/or be in a supervisory/chief pilot role within a CAR Part 135 air operation.
- c) Be from different geographical, age, gender and experience groups.

The whole process is confidential and completely free of any regulatory oversight issues.

If you would like to support this important research, please contact John Guselli on 0419 015684 and he will provide you with the necessary documentation.

Sponsors

We would like to thank our generous sponsors who have supported us despite the impact of COVID-19 on their organisations:





**APPLICATIONS
CLOSING**

FRIDAY 7 MAY 2021

Macarthur Job Scholarship 2021

ASASI continues its partnership with the Flight Safety Foundation to encourage and assist tertiary-level students involved in the field of aviation safety and aircraft occurrence investigation. The Flight Safety Foundation remains 'Independent, International and Impartial' in championing the cause of aviation safety.


The ASASI - Flight Safety Foundation Macarthur Job Scholarship will provide an annual allocation of up to AUD\$2000 to support return travel, accommodation and registration at the annual ANZSASI Seminars held in Australia or New Zealand. (Details on the student area of the ASASI website)

Helicopter

[hel-i-kop-ter]
noun

1. A million parts rotating rapidly around an oil leak waiting for metal fatigue to set in.

also see:
"whirlybird"



Here's one for our Engineers




If you are not already a member of LinkedIn then simply search for this **ASASI** group and click on 'Request to Join'. Our group administrator (currently Neil Campbell) will approve the request (in due course!). Alternatively, simply click the LinkedIn icon to be directed to our ASASI group. The current policy is that non-members of ASASI are allowed to join the group as this will allow us to reach out to more people with an interest in air safety and to better promote the society and events such as conferences.



Yes it's still on!

June
2021



Despite border closures, politics and scare campaigns, we remain optimistic that we can remain open for business again in time for our rescheduled ANZSASI conference.

We will continue to keep you informed with progress in the planning and hope we will be able to make definite plans before this date.

Speakers who had agreed to deliver presentations in May 2020 have all been contacted and offered the opportunity of presenting in June 2021.

The information on the website will be updated with any new information. If you have already registered, your registration will automatically be transferred to the new dates unless you wish to cancel. The hotel booking information will be updated to reflect the new dates.

To make reservations or to move existing reservations please contact:

Ann-Marie Kansky
Group Reservations Agent
Novotel Surfers Paradise
3105 Surfers Paradise Blvd
Surfers Paradise QLD 4217 Australia
Tel: +61 (0) 7 5579 3499 Direct Tel: +61 7 5579 3400

Save the Date

ISASI 2021

A *Virtual* Conference



Call for Papers – ISASI 2021

Aug 30 – Sept 2, 2021

With “*Staying Safe: Moving Forward*” as our theme, we are excited to announce that

ISASI 2021 will be a VIRTUAL EVENT.

This will be a fully interactive platform so attendees can engage in a Q&A session and provide feedback. If you have no experience with this type of presentation do not be concerned, we will be providing assistance on the technical and delivery aspects once papers are selected.

While many of the papers chosen for ISASI 2020 are expected to be on the program, the 2021 Committee is inviting interested individuals to submit abstracts for papers that address **NEW** investigations or technology.

Presentation topics that support the theme may include, but are not limited to:

- Recent accident/incident investigations of interest.
- Novel investigation techniques for aircraft, helicopter, and drone accidents.
- Data investigation methods, techniques and future developments.
- Airport investigation methods and techniques.
- Future investigator selection criteria and training needs.
- Future of aircraft data capture and retrieval and protection of safety information.
- Future developments in underwater wreckage recovery.
- Future evolution of Family Assistance.

Abstracts should include the author’s current CV [1 page only please] and be sent to isasi2021papers@shaw.ca

Important dates:

March 20th, 2021 – Last date for receipt of abstracts.

May 8th, 2021 – Presenters informed of acceptance and provided with additional instructions.

May 22nd, 2021 – Draft program for the 2021 Seminar Technical Program will be published.

July 10th, 2021 – Last date for receipt of completed paper and PowerPoint presentation. Any papers not received by this date will be removed from the program and replaced by another speaker.

If you have questions related to the paper topics or any other inquiries about the program, please contact the ISASI 2021 Program Chair at avsafes@shaw.ca



ISASI 2022 Conference – Brisbane

The Pullman Hotel Brisbane will be our venue for the international conference between **29 August and 1 September 2022**.

The conference will follow the standard ISASI format of Tutorial on the Monday followed by three days of technical programs.

Brisbane is a great venue and there are many options for social activities for partners. More details will be provided in the new year.

Things to do in Brisbane

- Moreton Island
- Story Bridge Climb
- Brisbane River Cruise
- Stradbroke Island
- Wheel of Brisbane
- Lone Pine Koala Sanctuary
- Tangalooma




In Memoriam

Esperison "Marty" Martinez, Jr., 86, passed away on Wednesday, November 4, 2020.

Marty served as ISASI Forum editor for 20 years following his retirement as Editor-in-Chief of ALPA's magazine, Air Line Pilot. He had a 20-year career in the U.S. Navy and Air Force during which he served as a writer for the Air Force magazine, The Airman, and as Superintendent of the U.S. Armed Forces Radio & Television Network in Thailand.

A private family burial took place at Crownsville Veterans Cemetery, near Annapolis, Maryland with a celebration of life to follow during summer 2021.



ASASI Contact Details

www.asasi.org
log on: news
password: aviator



www.isasi.org
log on: membership number
password: your Christian name
(all lower case)

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